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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are used in order to provide security to
computer systems. There are many different types of IDS as it will be described
in detail in the next section. In our solution, we propose an on-line, adaptive
intrusion detection systems scheme for detecting unknown network attacks using
HMM models and logic. First, we will introduce some commonly used terminology
and different types of IDS.
1.2 Intrusion Detection System terminology
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are constantly developing and growing and
so is the terminology associated with it. In this section we will try to introduce
some of the most commonly used terminology [9].
Alert
An alert is a warning issued by the IDS to the system operator that an intrusion is
taking place or being attempted. On detecting an intrusion, the IDS will alert the
analyst using a variety of methods. If the console is local to the IDS the alert would
normally appear on the monitor. The use of a warning sound can be used though
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on a busy IDS this solution would not be the most popular one. Alerts to a remote
console can be sent using the vendor proprietary method (usually securely), email,
SMS/Pager, or any combination of these methods.
Anomaly
The majority of IDS will alert when certain events match the signature of a known
attack. An anomaly based IDS will build a profile of the host or network activity
over time. When an event occurs which is outside this profile the IDS will alarm,
i.e. when someone does something they haven’t done before. An example would be
a user who suddenly gains administrator or root privileges.
Attacks
Attacks can be considered attempts to penetrate a system or to circumvent a sys-
tem’s security in order to gain information, modify information or disrupt the in-
tended functioning of the targeted network or system. The following is a list and
explains the most common types of Internet attacks that an IDS is set up to detect.
Attacks: DOS - Denial Of Service attack
Rather then penetrating a system security by hacking, a DOS attack will just take
the system out, denying the service to its user. The means of achieving this are
varied from buffer overflows to flooding the systems resources. Currently systems
are slightly more aware of DOS, which results in more DDOS attacks.
Attacks: DDOS - Distributed Denial of Service attack
A standard DOS attack, the type that uses large quantities of data from a single
host to a remote host, can not deliver sufficient number of packets to achieve the
desired result; therefore the attack will be launched from many dispersed hosts,
2
hence the word ’distributed’ in the name. Sheer weight of numbers takes out either
the remote system or swamps it’s connection.
Attacks: Smurf
This is an older type of attack, but is still fequently attempted. A smurf occurs
when a ping is sent to a smurf amplifiers broadcast address using the spoofed source
address of the target; all the active hosts will then reply to the target, swamping the
connection. Current top ten smurf amplifiers can be found at http://www.powertech.no/smurf/
Attacks: Trojans
The term Trojan comes from the wooden horse used by the Greeks to attack Troy.
The horse contained Greek soldiers who spilled out of the horse, after it was wheeled
inside the city, and laid siege to the city and its inhabitants. In computer terms,
it originally referred to software that appears to be legitimate, but that actually
contains hidden malicious software. When this legitimate program is run, without
any knowledge of the user, the malicious software is installed also. Since the majority
of these malicious programs were remote control tools, the term Trojan soon evolved
to refer to this type of tool, such as BackOrifice, SubSeven, NetBus, etc.
Automated Response
Besides allerting to an attack, there are IDS that can automatically defend against
them. This is done in different ways, like reconfiguring routers and firewalls to
reject future traffic from the same address. However, problem with this method is
that attackers can use a reconfigured device to their own advantage by spoofing the
address of a friendly party and launching an attack; the IDS then configures the
routers and firewalls to reject these addresses, making the attacker’s attempt into
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a DOS attack. Another way to defend against attacks automatically is by injecting
packets on the network to reset the connection. The problem with this method is
there needs to exist an active interface, which would make itself susceptible to an
attack. This would require that the interface is inside the firewall or using some
other way around the problem.
Exploits
For every vulnerability there is an exploit, a mechanism by which to exploit the
vulnerability. An exploit can be considered the means of taking advantage of the
structural weakness of the vulnerability. In order to attack a system, a hacker
exploits vulnerabilities in the code.
Exploits: Zero Day Exploit
A zero day exploit is an exploit that isn’t known about in the wild, i.e. one that
hasn’t been caught yet. As soon as an exploit is discovered by the security world, it
can be patched against and signatures can be written for IDS thereby making the
exploit ineffective and the risk of being caught greater. Of course, zero day exploits
are a very valuable commodity to hackers.
False Negatives
A false negative occurs when an attack or an event is either not detected by the IDS
or is considered not dangerous by the analyst.
False Positives
A false positive is an event that is picked up by the IDS and declared an atack, but
is actually a legal behavior of the system.
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Firewalls
Firewalls are the network security door. They are not an IDS but their logs can pro-
vide valuable IDS information. A firewall works by rejecting unwanted connections
based on rules of criteria, such as source address, ports, etc.
Honeypot
A honeypot is a system that can simulate one or many vulnerable hosts, providing
an easy target for the hacker to attack. The honeypot should have no other role to
fulfill, therefore all connection attempts are deemed suspicious. Another purpose of
a honeypot is to take attackers attention from legitimate targets, and make them
waste their time while the original entry point is secured.
1.3 IDS Categories
Since there are a lot of types of IDSs, there are also many different ways of
how they work. The following is categorization of IDS based on type [9].
1.3.1 Application IDS
Application IDSs are aware of the intrusion signatures for specific applications,
usually the more vulnerable applications such as webservers, databases etc. How-
ever, many of the host-based IDSs that ordinarily look at operating systems, have
been becoming more application-aware. Many of the host-based IDSs that are not
application-aware by default can be trained to become so. For example, a host-based
IDS can provide information about everything that is going on from the event logs,
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including output from the event log reporting applications. Most of these events
can be filtered by the operator because they have no security relevance, but there
also exist events like viruses or failed accesses that can be given a higher priority.
An example of an application-specific IDS is Entercept Web Server Edition.
1.3.2 Consoles
In order to make an IDS suitable for the corporate environment, the dispersed
IDS agents need to report to a central console. Nowadays many central consoles will
also accept data from other sources, such as other vendors’ IDSs, firewalls, routers
etc. This information can be correlated to present a more complete attack picture.
Some consoles will also add their own attack signatures to those supplied at agent
level. Also, many of the consoles provide the facility of remotely administering the
IDS.
Examples of this IDS category implementation are Network Security Monitor
and Open Esecurity Platform.
1.3.3 File Integrity Checkers
When a system is compromised, attacker will often alter certain key files to
provide continued access and prevent detection. By applying a message digest (cryp-
tographic hash) to key files, the files can be checked periodically to see if they have
been altered, thus providing a degree of assurance. Upon detecting such a change,
the file integrity checker will trigger an alert. The same process can be employed by
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a system administrator after being successfully attacked, allowing the administrator
to ascertain the extent to which the system has been compromised. Previously, file
integrity checkers detected intrusions long after the event; however, more products
have recently been emerging that check files as they are accessed, thereby introduc-
ing a near real time IDS element.
Some of the examples of this IDS category are Tripwire and Intact.
1.3.4 Honeypots
As mentioned in the IDS terminology section, a honeypot is a system that
can simulate one or many vulnerable hosts, providing an easy target for the hacker
to attack. The honeypot should have no other role to fill; therefore, all connection
attempts should be deemed suspicious. Another purpose is delay: the attacker
wastes time on the honeypot while the original entry point is secured, leaving the
truly valuable assets alone.
Although one of the initial purposes of honeypots was to gather evidence for the
prosecution of malicious hackers, there is much talk of entrapment when deploying
honeypots; however, does the vulnerability of the honeypot give the hacker the
right to attack it? In order to reach the honeypot an attacker would have had to
circumvent at least one security device provided the honeypot is inside the attacked
network.
Some examples of honeypots are Mantrap and Sting.
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1.3.5 Host-based IDS
This kind of IDS monitors sys/event logs from multiple sources for suspi-
cious activity. Host-based IDSs (also known as host IDS) are best placed to detect
computer misuse from trusted insiders and those who have infiltrated the network
evading traditional methods of detection. Basically, it is an event log viewer. A
true host IDS will apply some signature analysis across multiple events/logs and/or
time. Many will also incorporate heuristics into the product. Some will introduce
an added benefit: because they operate at near real time, system faults are often
detected quickly, which makes them popular with security personnel. The term
host-based IDS has been applied to any kind of IDS sitting on a workstation/server.
Vendors have tried this for various products from Network Node IDS to File Integrity
Checkers.
Some of the examples of this IDS category are Kane Secure Enterprise and
Dragon Squire.
1.3.6 Hybrid IDS
Modern switched networks have created a problem for intrusion detection op-
erators. By default, switched networks don’t allow network interface cards to fully
operate in a promiscuous fashion (although some allow spanning ports or link mode
Terminal Access Points (TAPs), whereby a certain TAP will see the traffic on all
other TAPs.) However, some switches will not allow it at all, making the installation
of a traditional network IDS difficult. Furthermore, high network speeds mean that
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many of the packets may be dropped by a NIDS. A solution has arisen in the form
of Hybrid IDSs, which takes delegation of IDS to host one stage further, combining
Network Node IDS and Host IDS in a single package. While this solution gives
maximum coverage, consideration should be given to the amount of data and cost
that may result. Many networks reserve hybrid IDS for critical servers.
Some of this IDS category examples are CentraxICE and RealSecure Server
Sensor.
1.3.7 Network IDS (NIDS)
Network IDS monitors all network traffic passing on the segment where the
agent is installed, reacting to suspicious anomaly or signature-based activity. Tradi-
tionally these were promiscuous packet sniffers with IDS filters, though these days
they have to be far more intelligent, decoding protocols and maintaining state etc.
They come in the form of appliance-based products that you just plug in to software
that can be installed on computers. They analyze every packet for attack signatures,
though under network load many will start to drop packets.
Many Network IDS have the facility to respond to attacks, the one that was
covered under ’Automated Response’ previously.
Some of this IDS category examples are SecureNetPro and Snort.
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1.3.8 Network Node IDS (NNIDS)
Switched and/or high-speed networks have introduced a problem: some Net-
work IDS are unreliable at high speeds, when loaded they can drop a high percentage
of the network packets. Switched networks often prevent a network IDS from seeing
passing packets. Network Node IDSs delegate the network IDS function down to
individual hosts, alleviating the problems of both high speeds and switching.
While Network Node IDSs are closely related to personal firewalls, there are
differences. For a personal firewall to be classed as an NNIDS, event analysis would
have to be applied to the attempted connections. For instance, rather than ”at-
tempted connection to port *****” as it is found on many personal firewalls, a
NNIDS should identify a ”whatever” probe, applying a signature for the ”what-
ever” attack. A NNIDS would also pass events received at the host to a central
console.
Some of NNIDS examples are BlackICE Agent and Tiny CMDS.
1.3.9 Personal Firewall
Personal firewalls sit on individual systems and prevent unwanted connections,
incoming or outgoing. While not infallible, they are very effective in protecting hosts
from attacks.
Some of the examples are ZoneAlarm and Sybergen.
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1.3.10 Target-based IDS
This is one of those ambiguous IDS terms, which means different things to dif-
ferent people. One definition may refer to them being File Integrity Checkers, while
an alternative is a network IDS that only looks for signatures of attacks to which
the protected network may be vulnerable. The objective of the latter definition is
to speed up the IDS by not looking for unnecessary attacks, which raises a question
whether it is wise or not to exclude some attacks by default.
11
Chapter 2
HMM problems
In our proposed solution of IDS, we use statistical models to characterize differ-
ent behaviors of the system. The formal models representing normal and abnormal
behavior of a system (in this case captured in the string of bsm data) are discrete
Hidden Markov Models [1].
As described in [1], an HMM is an extension of Markov models to include
the case where the observation is a probabilistic function of the state - the result-
ing model is a doubly embedded stochastic process with an underlying stochastic
process that is not observable (it is hidden). An HMM is represented by a five-tuple
(S, V,A,B, pi), the elements of which are described as follows:
• Finite set of possible states
S = {S1, · · · , SN}, (2.1)
where Si denotes the individual state, and qt denotes the state at time t. The
number of states in the model is N .
• Finite set of possible observations
V = {v1, · · · , vM}, (2.2)
where the observation symbols correspond to the physical output of the system
being modelled. The number of distinct observation symbols per state, i.e.,
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the discrete alphabet size is M .
• Initial state distribution matrix pi = {pii} , such that
pii = Pr(q1 = Si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2.3)
• State transition probability distribution matrix A = {aij} , such that
aij = Pr(qt+1 = Sj|qt = Si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N. (2.4)
In a special case where every state can be reached from any other state in a
single hop, we will have aij > 0 for all i, j. For every other case, we would
have aij = 0 for some pairs of (i, j).
• Observation symbol probability distribution matrix for state j, B = {bj} ,
such that
bj(k) = Pr(Vk at t|qt = Sj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M. (2.5)
For fixed S and V , the parameters of an HMM are λ = {A,B, pi}. Given
appropriate values for S, V,A,B, and pi, the HMM generates an observation sequence
O = O1O2 · · ·OT where T is the number of observations in the sequence and each
observation Ot is a symbol from V .
2.1 Solving basic HMM problems
There are three basic problems that most applications reduce to. They are:
1. Given the model λ = (A,B, pi), how to compute Pr(O|λ), the probability of
the observation sequence O = O1O2 · · ·OT ?
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2. Given the model λ = (A,B, pi), how to choose a state sequence Q = q1q2 · · · qT
so that Pr(O,Q|λ), the joint probability of the given observation sequence
O = O1O2 · · ·OT and the state sequence given the model is maximized?
3. How to adjust the HMM model parameters λ = (A,B, pi) so that Pr(O|λ) is
maximized?
2.1.1 Problem 1.
The first problem is the evaluation problem, namely we want to calculate the
probability of the observation sequence O = O1O2 · · ·OT , given the model λ, i.e.
Pr(O|λ). This problem corresponds to classification problem in our proposed IDS
solution. In other words, we classify the observed sequence as a specific behavior
by choosing the behavior model corresponding to the maximum probability of the
observed sequence given the model.
We will briefly describe the computation process of this probability value; more
details can be found in [1]. It is possible to find Pr(O|Q, λ) for a fixed state sequence
Q = q1q2 · · · qT , then multiply it by Pr(Q|λ) and then just sum up over all possible
state sequences, Q’s. Thus,
Pr(O|Q, λ) = bq1(O1) · bq2(O2) · · · bqT (OT ) (2.6)
Pr(O|λ) = piq1aq1q2aq2q3 · · · aqT−1qT (2.7)
Hence, we have
Pr(O|λ) = ∑
allQ
Pr(O|Q, λ)Pr(Q|λ) = ∑
allQ
piq1bq1(O1)aq1q2bq2(O2) · · · aq(T−1)qT bqT (OT )
(2.8)
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However, this approach is computationally extensive, 2TNT multiplications,
i.e. even for small values, N = 5 and T = 100, we will have about 1072 multiplica-
tions [2], which would take a very long time even on a supercomputer to complete.
Therefore, we use the forward-backward algorithm:
A new forward variable is introduced, αt(i) and is defined as
αt(i) = Pr(O1O2 · · ·Ot, qt = Si|λ), (2.9)
the probability of the partial observation sequence up to time t and the state i at
time t, given the model λ. Computation of αt(i) is done by induction:
αt+1(j) =
[ N∑
i=1
αt(i)aij
]
bj(Ot+1), 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, 1 ≤ j, i ≤ N (2.10)
where
α1(i) = piibi(O1). (2.11)
The desired result is the sum of the terminal forward variables αT (i):
Pr(O|λ) =
N∑
i=1
αT (i). (2.12)
This approach involves calculations of the order ofN2T . It is useful to calculate
a backward variable βt(i) = Pr(Ot+1Ot+2 · · ·OT |qt = Si, λ),i.e. the probability of a
partial observation sequence from t+ 1 to the end, given state Si and the model λ,
since it will be used in solving the Problem 3.
After initialization
βT (i) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (2.13)
15
we iterate
βt(i) =
N∑
j=1
aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2.14)
2.1.2 Problem 2.
In this problem, objective is to find the ”optimal” state sequence associated
with the given observation sequence, i.e. to find Q = q1q2 · · · qT that will maximize
Pr(O,Q|λ). The algorithm that solves this problem is called the Viterbi Algorithm
[3]. This is an inductive procedure that at each instant keeps the best possible state
sequence (i.e. the one giving maximum probability) for each of the N states as the
intermediate state for the desired observation sequence O = O1O2 · · ·OT . Finally,
the path with the highest probability is selected. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Initialization:
δ1(i) = piibi(O1) 1 ≤ i ≤ N (2.15)
φ1(i) = 0. (2.16)
where
δt(i) = maxq1,q2,···,qt−1Pr(q1q2 · · · qt = i, O1O2 · · ·Ot|λ) (2.17)
2. Recursion:
δt(j) = maxq≤i≤N [δt−1(j)aij]bj(Ot), 2 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ j ≤ N (2.18)
φt(j) = argmax1≤i≤N [δt−1(i)aij]. (2.19)
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3. Termination:
P ∗ = max1≤i≤N [δT (i)] (2.20)
q∗T = argmax1≤i≤N [δT (i)]. (2.21)
4. Reconstruction:
q∗t = φt+1(q
∗
t+1), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1. (2.22)
The resulting path, q∗1, q
∗
2, · · · , q∗T solves the Problem 2. More detailed descrip-
tion of the Viterbi Algorithm can be found in [3].
2.1.3 Problem 3.
This problem, the most difficult one from the three, is to determine a method of
adjusting the λ parameters of an HMM to maximize the likelihood of the training set.
In other words, we will use this method, called the Baum-Welch algorithm, to train
our HMM models. This corresponds to the training process in our proposed IDS
solution, when we want to create a model corresponding to the observed sequence.
An initial HMM model is assumed and is further improved by using the for-
mulas below, in order to maximize Pr(O|λ). An initial HMM can be constructed
in any way, randomly or by some other estimation algorithm. The Baum-Welch al-
gorithm maximizes Pr(O|λ), also called the likelihood function, by adjusting the
parameters of λ. This optimization criterion is called the maximum likelihood
criterion.
A new variable, representing the probability of a trajectory being in state Si
at time t and making the transition to Sj at t + 1 given the observation sequence
17
and model is given as
ξt(i, j) = Pr(qt = Si, qt+1 = Sj|O, λ) (2.23)
We compute these probabilities using the forward backward variables:
ξt(i, j) =
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
Pr(O|λ) (2.24)
The probability of being in state Si at time t, given the observation sequence
and the model is defined as:
γt(i) = Pr(qt = Si|O, λ) (2.25)
which is obtained by summing over j:
γt(i) =
N∑
j
ξt(i, j). (2.26)
Also, note that
T−1∑
t=1
γt(i) = expected number of transitions fromSi, (2.27)
and
T−1∑
t=1
ξt(i, j) = expected number of transitions from Si to Sj. (2.28)
Therefore, formulas for re-estimation of parameters of an HMM are given
below:
pˆii = γt(i) = expected frequency (number of times) in state Si at time t = 1
(2.29)
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aˆij =
T−1∑
t=1
ξt(i, j)
T−1∑
t=1
γt(i)
=
expected number of transitions from state Si to state Sj
expected number of transitions from state Si
(2.30)
bˆj(k) =
T∑
t=1,Ot=k
γt(j)
T∑
t=1
γt(j)
=
expected number of times in state j and observing symbol vk
expected number of times in state j
(2.31)
The procedure starts with the initial model λ. If the re-estimation model
λˆ 6= λ, and if Pr(O|λˆ) > Pr(O|λ), then we have found a better model from which
the observation sequence O = O1O2 · · ·OT is more likely to be produced. The
procedure is repeated iteratively until P (O|λ) is maximized, which solves Problem
3.
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Chapter 3
Data set
Data set used to test the proposed IDS scheme was created at MIT Lincoln
Laboratory and provided as part of the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation
[4].
The data is collected over a period of six weeks. The first two weeks should
be considered as ”alpha” training data collected as the simulation becomes fully
instantiated and reaches a steady state [4]. Therefore this data should be used for
initial training of IDS. The final four weeks of training data are more similar. They
include more types of background traffic and attack variants then the first two weeks
of data.
The first week of training data starts with a large amount of background traffic
and average of two attacks per day. During the first and second week, services,
attacks and additional traffic types are added until traffic patterns reach a final
steady state by the end of the second week. The four remaining weeks will remain
similar to each other with regard to attack types and background traffic. The six
weeks of data includes more than 100 instances of 20 different attack types.
Data was collected continuously on a real network which simulated more than
1000 virtual hosts and 700 virtual users. There was BSM (Basic Security Module)
tcpdump data. We used Solaris BSM audit records that contain a system call name,
20
a set of arguments, process ID, user ID, etc, but the only information we used in
simulations are system call name and payload associated with it.
3.1 Data transformation
In order to use the BSM data in the scheme, it was necessary to transfer it
into a more suitable form for processing.
Since a BSM file contains the activity performed on machine pascal over one
day, it includes both normal behavior of the system and attack traces. This big
string is parsed into smaller strings containing 100 system calls each. The system
calls are enumerated. Each file containing the parsed string is named as, for example,
W3Monday.bsm.txt.split.10, which means that it is a 10th string of 100 system calls
collected on Monday of the 3rd week of training.
Now, another pass is made through all the files and payload size associated
with each system call is observed. This is done in order to differentiate between
traces that contain only normal behavior of the system and traces that contain
attack traces 1.
After completing this, another pass was made in order to collect traces of each
attack, i.e. W5Thursday.eject.txt, which is a self explanatory file name. Then, the
attack traces are parsed into strings of 100 system calls, containing name of the
attack and sequence index, labeled as i.e. W5Thursday.eject.split.bad.342. Since in
the window of time while an attack is going on there is also legal behavior of the
1Code developed by Trevor Vaughan, UMD
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system, additional difficulty is present for detecting the attack - the probability of
false negatives is high.
Now, since we need a sequence of numbers to use for HMM testing and training,
we will map the system calls into numbers. What is specific to the buffer overflow
attacks is payload size, and we want to somehow use that information. Therefore,
we need to differentiate the system calls associated with huge payloads from the
rest of the system calls. The algorithm passes through a file and assumes a number
n for a system call (one-to-one mapping). If there is a payload greater than 300
associated with the specific system call, the number associated with that system
call is 2*n. If the payload is less then 300, that system call is associated with the
number 2*n-1. Therefore, if there is originally 60 different system calls, we will have
120 possible output numbers that will be used further.
3.2 Attack schedule
The following Table 3.1 describes the attacks we use in the scheme, that were
included in training data of [4]. The first column indicates the week of the training
and the second indicates the day. Third column shows starting time of the attack.
All the attacks target the machine pascal. The last two columns specify the name
and the variant of an attack. Keywords in the ”Variant” column specify parameters
and conditions for this instance of an attack. The keyword ”clear” means that the
attack was not made stealthy and that components of the attack should be visible in
tcpdump and/or bsm data. The keyword ”stealthy” means that attempts were made
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to hide components of the attack in the sniffing or audit data by encryption, by
spreading the attack over multiple sessions, or by other techniques. Other keywords
indicate characteristics of specific attacks or arguments for different attack programs.
Each of the attacks is explained in more detail in the following section.
3.3 The three attacks
The three attacks that will be used to evaluate our IDS scheme are eject,
ffbconfig and fdformat. All of them belong to a class of User to Root exploits.
In these exploits the attacker starts out with access to a normal user account on the
system (maybe obtained by sniffing passwords, a dictionary attack, social engineer-
ing,..) and is able to exploit some vulnerability to gain root access to the system
[5].
User to Root attacks cover several different types of attacks of which the most
common one is the buffer overflow attack. Buffer overflow occurs when a program
copies too much data into a static buffer without checking if the buffer can take
that amount of data. All of the three attacks that will be described in detail here
are types of a buffer overflow attacks.
Other User to Root attacks take advantage of poor temporary file management
of some programs, some exploit race condition in the actions of a single program,
or more programs running simultaneously.
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Week Day Time Attack Variant
1 Monday 08:05:07 format clear
1 Monday 08:07:13 ffb clear
3 Monday 11:32:20 ffb clear
4 Friday 09:22:12 ffb add .rhosts, stealthy
4 Friday 10:55:44 format stealthy
5 Monday 14:10:20 ffb ftp’s over exploit files
5 Monday 16:22:25 ffb chmod files
5 Monday 17:47:29 ffb executes attack
5 Monday 20:14:14 format clear
5 Tuesday 14:43:08 eject clear
5 Tuesday 16:39:11 eject clear
5 Wednesday 22:42:37 eject stealthy
5 Friday 08:50:38 format ftp over files
5 Friday 12:34:29 eject run self contained exploit
5 Friday 13:04:22 format chmod exploit files
5 Thursday 09:06:46 ffb
5 Thursday 09:32:03 eject
5 Thursday 09:50:46 eject
5 Thursday 10:00:14 eject
Table 3.1: Attack schedule
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3.3.1 Eject
Description
The eject program is used by some removable media devices that do not have an
eject button or by removable media devices that are managed by Volume Manage-
ment, in Solaris [5]. Since the bounds checking on arguments in the volume manage-
ment library is insufficient, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the
eject program. In this way, the attacker can use this (buffer overflow) vulnerability
to gain root access on attacked systems.
Attack Signature
An intrusion detection system can identify this attack by looking at the contents of
the telnet or rlogin session the attacker is using (assuming that an attacker has
already gained access to an account of the target machine and is running the exploit
as a part of a remote session) and ’catching’ one of the following events:
- assuming that an attacker transmits the C code to the target machine unen-
crypted, the IDS can scan for specific strings in the source code, i.e. when
instead of the ’jump to’ address, there is a string of unexpected characters
(Ox%lxB[%d]..) or there is a line
execl(’/bin/eject’,’eject’,&buf(char*)0);
- in case the attacker encrypts the source code, the ’jump to’ address will have
unexpected argument
- host based IDS can catch an eject attack by performing bottleneck verification
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on the transition from normal user to root user and noticing that the user
didn’t make a legal user to root transition.
3.3.2 Ffbconfig
Description
The ffbconfig program configures the Creator Fast Frame Buffer (FFB) Graphics
Accelerator, which is part of the FFB Configuration Software Package, SUNWffbcf.
This software is used when the FFB Graphics Accelerator card is installed. As with
eject attack, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the ffbconfig
program, since the bounds checking on arguments is insufficient.
Attack Signature
As is the case with the eject attack, the attacker who is exploiting the vulnerabil-
ity has to transfer the code for the exploit onto the target machine, and then run
the exploit. The IDS should look for the specific strings within the source code.
A host based IDS can perform bottleneck verification or scan for the invocation
of the ”/usr/sbin/ffbconfig/” command with an oversized argument for the ”-dev”
parameter.
3.3.3 Fdformat
Description
The fdformat attack also exploits buffer overflow. The fdformat program formats
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diskettes and PCMCIA memory cards. This program also uses the same volume
management library and is exposed to the same vulnerability as the eject program.
Attack Signature
Similar to the two attacks described above, the attacker transfers the code for the
exploit into the target machine and then runs the exploit. The IDS looks for specific
strings within the source code, or invocation of the command ”/usr/sbin/fdformat”
with an oversized argument.
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Chapter 4
Proposed IDS scheme: Introduction and Phase 1 - Initialization
In this chapter, we will describe in detail our proposed IDS scheme solution.
If only misuse detection is used, there will be a lot of false negatives. On the other
hand, if only anomaly detection is used, there will be a high rate of false positives.
Therefore, we will try to introduce a hybrid solution, the one that satisfies the need
for a good trade-off.
Since security is the goal, the main idea is to set the detection rate and then,
through further analysis, minimize the false positive rate. We want good detection,
low false positive rate, correct classification and detection of unknown attacks. Also,
we want our IDS scheme to be on-line and adaptive.
The scheme consists of five phases: initialization, parallel testing and train-
ing, logic, verification and adaptive phase. In the first phase we construct HMM
models for normal behavior and known attacks. By doing this, we actually parti-
tion ’probabilistic space’ into three entities: normal behavior, known attacks and
unknown attacks. In the second phase, we do the HMM multi-hypotheses testing
of the incoming sequence against our models, while in parallel we also train current
behavior model. In the third, logic phase, we take any suspicious sequences passed
on by the previous phase and analyze it against logic models created using limited
knowledge. In case that the sequence is not shown to be normal, we pass it on to
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Initialization
Parallel Testing and Training
Logic
Verification
Adaptive phase
incoming sequence
if sequence suspicious, pass
to Logic
if sequence satisfies 
attack logic, verify
if not, update normal
databas
if verified attack, update
attack databases,
otherwise update
normal database
Figure 4.1: Overall block scheme of the proposed IDS
the fourth phase where we verify if the sequence in fact is malicious and classify it
correctly. The last phase updates our model databases. Through the whole scheme,
there are several levels of alarms, (possibly) going off after each phase, hence alerting
the administrator or triggering a possible automated response. The block scheme is
shown in Fig. 4.1.
In this phase, the goal is to obtain models for all of the known attacks and
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a model for normal behavior, as described in Chapter 2. Note that, in order to
evaluate our scheme, we will ’hide’ at least one attack - it will be ’unknown’, and,
at the end, the scheme should be able to make a model for that one as well.
An HMM model is obtained by training an initial model with sequences ob-
tained after transformation from BSM data. The model is trained sequentially with
sequences of 100 system calls each, using the Matlab HMM Toolbox. After a rela-
tively small number of iterations, log likelihoods for each model will stabilize.
We assume that states are unknown (hidden), and the only thing that we can
observe is the sequence of numbers (produced by Data transformation algorithm).
We start by assuming (random) transition and observation matrices. Then, we start
the training process, by using the iterative algorithm that alters the transition and
observation matrices so that at each step the adjusted matrices are more likely to
generate the observed sequence (the training sequence). We have observed that
parameters do not change significantly after a very small number of iterations (3),
which is useful because of the run-time of the algorithm.
Assume that we know attacks eject and ffbconfig, but we have not seen
fdformat yet. The ultimate goal of this scheme is to come up with an HMM model
at the end for the fdformat attack as well.
The Normal HMM model is trained with attack-free sequences. However,
since we want the scheme to also update this model in case there is normal behavior
not previously seen, we will not use all the normal behavior sequences. For example,
the Normal HMM model can be trained with normal sequences collected during
first five weeks, and then, in the testing phase, we can use sequences from sixth
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week to check if the scheme works or gives false alarm.
The Attack #1 HMM model is trained with the sequences of that attack,
for example, for the eject attack. The same procedure is done for Attack #2
HMM model and Attack #3 HMM model. We will use different combinations
of known/unknown attacks, in order to evaluate the performance.
4.1 Normal Databases
In order to have maximal possible detection rate, with as small false alarm rate
as possible, we need to make a good, extensive normal behavior database. However,
in the data available, there is a huge number of normal sequences, and in order to
have a good performance of our algorithm, we need to store it for future convenient
and efficient use.
4.1.1 Normal HMM models
Since there are eight groups of collected sequences [4], each group representing
a day in a specific week, we decided to make one model for each group. There are
several reasons for that. First of all, if we had too many models, during simulation
it would be impossible to have on-line detection, since memory access time would
contribute a huge delay. Also, the issue would be storage. However, most of all, we
would have to worry about overtraining. This means that our database would be
’too extensive’, it would most probably cover much more virtual space, which we
want to avoid, in order to be able to detect attacks, which are often embedded in the
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normal behavior sequences. For obtaining HMM models we used training process
described in Chapter 2. In simulations, we used HMM MATLAB toolbox [8].
Day 1
This group of sequences was collected on Monday of the first week of testing.
It consists of 7330 sequences of length 100. Each sequence was used as an input to
the HMM algorithm [8]. HMM has 5 states and 120 observations (each one for the
mapping of a system call). Before training, the HMM has initial probability matrix
[0.996,0.001,0.001,0.001,0.001), i.e. we start from the first state. Since every HMM
model is characterized by 3 matrices: initial state probability matrix, transition
matrix and observation matrix, we have to use them in order to represent accurately
final representative model. Initial state probability matrix does not change much
in the process and is not of a great importance for the future testing, so we will
concentrate on the other two, transition probability (A) matrix and observation (B)
matrix.
It is shown that there are little discrepancies between A matrices of these 7330
HMM models. This can be explained by the fact that during a course of one day,
locality of time and locality of usage stereotypes the behavior. In the Fig. 4.2 we
have shown 10 randomly chosen A matrices out of this group. It can clearly be seen
that differences are minimal. Therefore, as a representative A matrix for the whole
group we decided to use an average matrix of all 7330 A matrices, Fig. 4.3.
Analog logic is used in creating a representative B matrix for the group, instead
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Figure 4.2: Transition matrices of 10 randomly chosen HMM’s of Day 1
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Figure 4.3: Transition matrix (A) for Day 1
that the B matrices are not as similar to each other as A matrices are, but we want
to include every possible observable achieved by individual models, with weight
proportional to its weight in individual matrices and to the number of individual
matrices that contain it. Therefore, the averaging is fully justified and needed. In
the Fig. 4.4 we are showing 10 randomly chosen B matrices from this group. Also,
in Fig. 4.5 we’ve shown the average, representative matrix for the first normal HMM
model that we will use in our Normal Database.
Day 2
Using the same procedure as for the first group of normal behavior sequences,
we have created a representative HMM model for the second group. This group
consists of 19332 sequences of length 100, and is collected on Monday of the third
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Figure 4.4: Observation matrices of 10 randomly chosen HMM’s of Day 1
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Figure 4.5: Observation matrix (B) for Day 1
week of collecting data [4].
The resulting model’s A matrix is shown in Fig. 4.6.
Also, the representative matrix B for the second group is obtained using the
same procedure as for the previous group and is shown in Fig. 4.7.
Day 3
Third group consists of 19529 sequences of length 100, collected on Friday of
the fourth week of collecting data.
The representative model’s A matrix is shown in Fig. 4.8.
Also, the representative matrix B for this group is shown in Fig. 4.9.
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Figure 4.6: Transition matrix (A) for Day 2
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Figure 4.7: Observation matrix (B) for Day 2
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Figure 4.8: Transition matrix (A) for Day 3
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Figure 4.9: Observation matrix (B) for Day 3
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Figure 4.10: Transition matrix (A) for Day 4
Day 4
Fourth group consists of 8740 sequences of length 100, collected on Friday of
the fifth week of collecting data.
The representative model’s A matrix is shown in Fig. 4.10.
Also, the representative matrix B for this group is shown in Fig. 4.11.
Day 5
Fifth group consists of 17058 sequences of length 100, collected on Monday of
the fifth week of collecting data.
The representative model’s A matrix is shown in Fig. 4.12.
Also, the representative matrix B for this group is shown in Fig. 4.13.
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Figure 4.11: Observation matrix (B) for Day 4
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Figure 4.12: Transition matrix (A) for Day 5
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Figure 4.13: Observation matrix (B) for Day 5
Day 6
Sixth group consists of 11145 sequences of length 100, collected on Tuesday of
the fifth week of collecting data.
The representative model’s A matrix is shown in Fig. 4.14.
The representative matrix B for this group is shown in Fig. 4.15.
Day 7
Seventh group consists of 8445 sequences of length 100, collected onWednesday
of the fifth week of collecting data.
The representative model’s A matrix is shown in Fig. 4.16.
Also, the representative matrix B for this group is shown in Fig. 4.19.
41
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Column
Row
Va
lu
e
Figure 4.14: Transition matrix (A) for Day 6
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Figure 4.15: Observation matrix (B) for Day 6
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Figure 4.16: Transition matrix (A) for Day 7
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Figure 4.17: Observation matrix (B) for Day 7
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Figure 4.18: Transition matrix (A) for Day 8
Day 8
Eight group consists of 9143 sequences of length 100, collected on Thursday
of the sixth week of collecting data.
The representative model’s A matrix is shown in Fig. 4.18.
The representative matrix B for this group is shown in Fig. 4.19.
4.1.2 Normal sample sequences
In the verification stage of the proposed algorithm we will need sample se-
quences of normal behavior. Therefore, it is necessary that we collect them during
the initialization phase. It is very subjective what number of sequences should be
collected. We decided to keep every thousandth sequence. There is a total of 100722
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Figure 4.19: Observation matrix (B) for Day 8
normal sequences, which means that in our database of sample normal sequences
we will have a hundred of them.
4.2 Attack Databases
Since we will have to do verification in the Phase 4, we need to have some
attack databases that will help us decide whether a suspicious trace of system calls
should be classified as normal behavior or as an attack. Further, it will be used to
determine whether, if it turns out to be an attack, it is a variation of an already
known attack, or it is a new one.
We will use the idea of attack tree representation [7]. Every attack has a
sequence of actions (in the form of states and transitions) that sufficiently describe
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eject ./ejectexploit · · · large header and execution of /usr/bin/eject E1 A
large header and execution of /usr/bin/eject · · · stat(2) E2 B
stat(2) · · · /usr/bin/ksh E3 C
/usr/bin/ksh · · · pipe, fork E4 D
ffbconfig ./ffbconfig · · · large header and execution of /usr/bin/ffbconfig FF1 G
large header and execution of /usr/bin/ffbconfig · · · /usr/bin/ksh FF2 H
/usr/bin/ksh · · · pipe, fork FF3 D
fdformat ./fdformat · · · large header and execution of /usr/bin/fdformat FD1 I
large header and execution of /usr/bin/fdformat · · · /usr/bin/ksh FD2 J
/usr/bin/ksh · · · pipe, fork FD3 D
Table 4.1: Attack Elementary Instance Database
the attack. We take this attack tree and chunk it into separate branches with states
on both ends of the branch. These branches will represent elementary instances of
attacks, so we add them to Attack Instance Vocabulary Database. This is done for
every known attack. Of course, it can not be assumed that this database will be
complete, but we can improve it by adding ’artificial’ elementary instances, created
by an expert who has knowledge of the programs running on the system to be
protected.
The elementary instances for each attack are shown in the Table 4.1 (the last
two columns represent the attack instance, the last column is ’global’ representa-
tion).
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A ./ejectexploit · · · large header and execution of /usr/bin/eject
B large header and execution of /usr/bin/eject · · · stat(2)
C stat(2) · · · /usr/bin/ksh
D /usr/bin/ksh · · · pipe, fork
G ./ffbconfig · · · large header and execution of /usr/bin/ffbconfig
H large header and execution of /usr/bin/ffbconfig · · · /usr/bin/ksh
I ./fdformat · · · large header and execution of /usr/bin/fdformat
J large header and execution of /usr/bin/fdformat · · · /usr/bin/ksh
K ./ps exploit · · · large header and execution of /usr/bin/ps
L large header and execution of /usr/bin/ps · · · /usr/bin/ksh
M pipe, fork · · · stat, fork
Table 4.2: Attack instance vocabulary database
4.2.1 Attack Instance Vocabulary Database
Therefore, the Attack Instance Vocabulary Database will consist only of ele-
mentary instances from the Table 4.1 above, avoiding double records, as shown in
Table 4.2:
4.2.2 Attack Sequence Database
Now that we have comprehensive Attack Instance Vocabulary Database, we
can make paths for each attack and associate certain weights to each part of a path.
This will enable us to calculate the probability that a sequence under consideration
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eject A · · · B · · · C · · · D
ffbconfig G · · · H · · · D
fdformat I · · · J · · · D
Table 4.3: Attack sequence database
is sufficiently suspicious. For the three attacks, the Attack Sequence Database is
shown in Table 4.3:
4.2.3 New initialized HMM model
Since our proposed algorithm is also adaptive, we will need an additional,
initialized new HMM model that will be trained during testing, in the Phase 2 of
parallel testing and training. The purpose of this new model is to capture the current
behavior being tested, in order to use it for cross-testing in the verification phase,
but, more importantly, to be used for adaptive phase if needed (in case during the
execution of our algorithm we decide that the current behavior is normal but not
previously seen or abnormal known but not previously seen, or just unknown; we
will want to update the corresponding database for future, more accurate use).
At the end of the initialization phase, we have several databases and HMM models
for normal and abnormal behavior.
- Normal HMM models
- Normal sample sequences database
- Attack Instance Vocabulary Database
48
- Attack Sequence Database
- Attack #1 HMM model
- Attack #2 HMM model
- initialized new HMM model
and the goal is to detect and create an HMM model for Attack #3 (unknown)
or update the already known models.
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Chapter 5
Proposed IDS scheme: Phase 2 - Parallel testing and training
Since the goal of our proposed IDS scheme is to detect unknown attacks as
well as known, but previously not seen, we will need a way to capture the behavior
that is being currently tested so we can use it to update our databases and models.
Therefore we are introducing this parallel testing and training phase.
5.1 Testing
Testing part of this phase tests sequentially the incoming sequences, one by
one. Using the procedure explained in Chapter 2, we first test the sequence against
the normal HMM models. Span of the normal HMM models has been adjusted to
the data we have, in a way that it covers the virtual circular space not covered
by the attack models. Since this is the first discriminative step, and we want to
be able to detect all the attacks, known or unknown, we set up a very rigorous
threshold for log-likelihood value. Anything that passes the threshold is safe and
no further testing is needed. There is also no need to update the normal database,
since the sequence being tested already belongs to the normal ’space’. The virtual
probabilistic space is shown in Fig. 5.1.
In case we get a negative answer, we suspect that the sequence does not
belong to the normal space and we continue testing it against the known attack
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attacks
unknown
attacks
normal behavior
Figure 5.1: Virtual Probabilistic Space
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HMM models. Since we have a very rigorous threshold, a lot of sequences will not
belong to any of the models - they’ll be considered unknown. Those sequences,
together with the sequences that gave positive answer to some HMM attack model,
are labelled suspicious and passed on to the next phase - logic. We will also have
classification here (this is not the final classification; it is here only to give more
information to the administrator).
The sequence will be classified as belonging to class k, where
k = argmaxiPr(O|λi), i = 1, 2, 3, N
if
Pr(O|λk) > threshold,
otherwise,
k = U
where k=1,2,3,N,U corresponds to Attack #1, Attack #2, Attack #3, Normal be-
havior and Unknown attack class, respectively.
5.2 Training
Along with testing a sequence, we also train the additional, new, initialized
HMM with this sequence. This way we make an HMMmodel of the current sequence
that encapsulates system’s behavior at that moment and that could be used in the
later phases of the algorithm if necessary. This model is being initialized over and
over again for every incoming sequence. However, if alarm is raised in Phase 3 of
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Figure 5.2: Parallel testing and training
the scheme, this model is being used for verification (phase 4) and possible updating
of a specific database (phase 5).
The parallel testing and training scheme is shown in Fig. 5.2.
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Chapter 6
Proposed IDS scheme: Phase 3 - Logic
Logic phase of the algorithm is invoked when a sequence is labelled as sus-
picious. Since probabilistic testing alone can not give good results we needed to
combine different methods in order to reach satisfying results. Since the testing
threshold in the previous phase was set as very rigorous, in order to have good de-
tection rate, this fact introduces another type of error: false positives (false alarms).
Therefore, from now on the main task will be to differentiate ’good’ sequences from
’bad’ ones in this group of suspicious traces.
Every sequence consists of 100 system calls. In the logic phase, a sequence
can be scanned for elementary sequences listed in Table 4.2. The important part is
that this scanning has to capture the sequential nature of elementary sequences, i.e.
order is important. Now, it is important to assign probabilities of alarm to every
elementary sequence. Having them lined in a specific order, Table 4.2, probabilities
are being added up and as soon as a certain threshold value is reached, alarm is
raised. Therefore, the probability of the alarm in the third phase will be:
Alarm probability =
max{pA · IA + pB · IB + pC · IC + pD · ID,
pG · IG + pH · IH + pD · ID,
pI · II + pJ · IJ + pD · ID}
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The alarm will be raised if this probability exceeds the set threshold:
ALARM = (Alarmprobability > alarmthreshold)
In case that a sequence passes this logic test, without raising an alarm, the
sequence is proclaimed normal and ’sent’ to the phase 5 for adaptation, i.e. updating
the normal database. In case an alarm is raised, two actions take place: the sequence
is passed onto phase 4 - verification and the spare HMM model that was trained
with this sequence in phase 2 is kept and sent to the verification phase.
The logic part of the scheme is shown in the figure Fig. 6.1
Since in the real-world applications we might not be able to know in advance
all of these specifications of the attacks, we decided to use limited knowledge of
information in order to evaluate our IDS scheme. Therefore, for the logic of the
alarm we used only two sequential paths of system calls for all the alarms.
ALARM =′ execve′ · Iexecve & (′pipe′ · Ipipe | ′fork′ · Ifork) (6.1)
Hence, note that this phase does not actually contribute to the classification
at all, just the detection.
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Chapter 7
Proposed IDS scheme: Phase 4 - Verification
The verification phase introduces another probabilistic testing, since not every
sequence that raises an alarm in the logic phase has to be malicious. Therefore, in
this phase we hope to identify more normal sequences that have reached this phase
and should not be here. The solution we found lies in cross-testing. It is very
well known that log-likelihood estimation is not symmetric. However, not in spite
of that fact, but due to it, we are able to extract more information. With this
novel approach, we use our new HMM model from phase 2 trained with the current
sequence, and test all the normal sample sequences from that database against it.
This time, we are not aiming for extremely rigorous threshold value.
Any sequence that passes this cross-test for normal behavior is labelled as
normal and sent to the next phase for updating the normal database. If a sequence
does not pass this test it is assumed an attack sequence, that needs to be classified.
This new HMM model tests sequences of known attacks, and the one with the
maximum log-likelihood value is selected as a classification result, but only if the
resulting log-likelihood ratio is within the threshold. If it is not, the model is labelled
as an unknown attack and passed on to the next phase.
The verification part of this scheme is shown in the figure Fig. 7.1.
The final classification is made in this stage. The sequence will be classified
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as belonging to class k, where
k = argmaxiPr(Oi|λ), i = 1, 2, 3, N
if
Pr(Ok|λ) > threshold,
otherwise,
k = U
where k=1,2,3,N,U corresponds to Attack #1, Attack #2, Attack #3, Normal be-
havior and Unknown attack class, respectively.
Note that this testing is similar but not the same with the one done in Phase
2. Here we are testing a collection of sequences against one HMM model, while in
the Phase 2 we tested (one) incoming sequence against several HMM models.
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Chapter 8
Proposed IDS scheme: Phase 5 - Adaptive phase
Adaptive part of the scheme does exactly that, it updates specific databases
with the current (sequence) behavior model passed on from the previous phases.
If a sequence that went through the algorithm was labelled as a known attack
(but that sequence was not previously seen, of course), then the model created in
phase 2 and verified in phase 4 is simply added to the corresponding database.
If a sequence was labelled as unknown attack, the model for it is stored in the
unknown attack database.
However, if a sequence passed the test, and was labelled as normal, the model is
not just simply added to the normal database. Since the normal database consists of
only 8 HMM models, adding a model for each not previously seen normal sequence
would significantly change the database, and hence enable adversary to actually
train our IDS system and then attack it without a risk of being caught. Therefore,
a new HMM does participate in the normal database, but it’s added proportionally
to it’s contribution. In other words, if we decide to add a new HMM model to an
HMM model comprised of 10000 (averaged) different HMM’s, it’s contribution to
the representative model will be 1/10001 compared to 10000/10001 contribution of
the existing model. This way, we protect our IDS from adversary training.
The complete scheme incorporates all five phases and is shown in Fig. 8.2.
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Chapter 9
Results
9.1 Known attack detection and classification
Under ’known attack’, we mean a type of an attack that has happened before
and we have some knowledge about it. We tested FFB attack as ’known attack’,
i.e. we had previous instances of that type of attack happen before, so we do have
some idea how it should look like. In our data there were 9 instances of FFB attack,
some during the same day. We tested each one of them as a new instance of a
known attack. Of course, we had a database of several models for that FFB attack,
but also databases for other two attacks, FORMAT and EJECT. Also, we had our
normal models database. In all the cases, the attack was detected, and, in this case,
perfectly classified.
When we tested FORMAT attack as a known attack, we used 3 instances of
the attack. Those instances were happened on Day 1, Day 4 and Day 5 of data
collection ??. Due to the good solution of our scheme we have a perfect detection,
but, since there is such a few data, it was not possible to appropriately ’cover’ the
space of the FORMAT attack, therefore we have misclassifications. One instance of
the FORMAT attack was classified correctly, one was misclassified as an FFB attack
and one was labelled as unknown (which we prefer over labelling it as a wrong type
of known attack).
63
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
FFB FORMAT EJECT Unknown
attack
Normal
0%0%0%0%
100%
Figure 9.1: Known attack #1 - FFB
There was 7 instances of EJECT attack, two of them were in the Day 3, and
the rest of them in Day 4 through Day 8. However, it seems that each instance
of this attack was pretty specific, so there were some misclassifications: only one
instance was classified correctly, two were classified as FFB attack and the rest were
labelled unknown.
Overall, it seems that the FFB attack is the most general one, and the other
two tend to be misclassified as FFB. However, note that this is the worst case
scenario for our scheme, since all three attacks belong to the same type of attacks -
buffer overflows. In case we had more different attacks, the results would be much
better. Also, we used only limited knowledge of the attacks. If we include more
information, the results will only get better. Our objective is to show that we can
do very well using as limited information as possible.
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9.2 Unknown attack detection and classification
In this experiment, we assumed that out of our three types of attacks, we have
seen only two before, i.e. we have no prior knowledge of the third attack whatsoever.
First, we tested FFB as an unknown attack. The log-likelihood ratios were
compared with (other two) known attacks and normal behavior, and if a threshold
was not met, the sequence is labelled unknown. All of the 9 sequences of the
unknown attack (FFB) were detected and classified as such. Also, all the models of
those sequences are saved and stored for future use (as explained in Adaptive phase
of the scheme).
Secondly, we tested FORMAT attack as unknown (we had no models of this
type of attack stored). For the reasons explained earlier, the obvious generality of
FFB behavior, we had some misclassifications: two instances were classified as FFB
attack and one was classified correctly as unknown.
65
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
FFB FORMAT EJECT Unknown
attack
Normal
16.6%
0%
50%
0%
33.3%
Figure 9.3: Known attack #3 - EJECT
Testing EJECT attack as unknown gave better results. Only two instances
of this attack were misclassified as FFB, and other four were labelled correctly as
unknown attack.
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9.3 Normal behavior classification - lowering false alarm rate
Since the principle idea of our proposed scheme is to set up desired detection
rate and then filter out false positives (false alarm), here we have results for testing
normal behavior of the system. Ideal result would be that all the sequences are
classified as normal at the end. However, that is not the case, we do have false
positives; however, the algorithm we designed filters them out through stages, so
the end false positive rate is very promising.
Test data in Day 1 consists of 7330 sequences of length 100. Each one is tested
with our algorithm and the results are shown in Fig. 9.7. After phase 2, Parallel
Testing and Training phase, we had 428 suspicious sequences. All of those were sent
through to Logic phase, where they were scanned for specific pairs of system calls.
Only the ones who satisfied our condition for malicious behavior (in this case 50)
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Figure 9.5: Unknown attack #2 - FORMAT
were passed onto the next phase of the algorithm for verification. At the end, we
had 9 sequences that were classified as anomalous. The false alarm rate for this set
of data was 0.1228%.
Normal behavior data from Day 2 consists of 19302 sequences of length 100.
Following the same procedure explained above for Day 1 test data, after the Parallel
Testing and Training phase we had 954 suspicious sequences there were sent to the
Logic phase. After the Logic phase, we had 121 sequences that satisfied condition
we imposed for malicious sequences which we sent on to the next phase for verifi-
cation. There were 31 sequences classified as anomalous, which makes false alarm
rate 0.1604%. The results are shown in Fig. 9.8.
Test data of Day 3 consists of 19529 sequences of length 100. Going by the
algorithm, after the phase of Parallel Testing and Training we had 749 suspicious
sequences that had to be passed on the the next, Logic phase. Only 72 sequences
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Figure 9.6: Unknown attack #3 - EJECT
came out of the Logic phase satisfying the conditions for malicious behavior and
they were passed on to the next stage for verification. There were only 5 sequences
classified as anomalous after the execution of the whole algorithm, which makes the
false alarm rate very low for this test data - 0.0256%, which is shown in Fig. 9.9.
Test data in Day 4 consists of 8740 sequences of length 100. The sequences
are sent through the algorithm and the results are shown in Fig. 9.10. After phase
2, Parallel Testing and Training phase, we had 918 suspicious sequences. All of
those were sent through to Logic phase. Only the ones who satisfied our condition
for malicious behavior ( 54 in this case) were passed onto the next phase of the
algorithm for verification. At the end, we had 5 sequences that were classified as
anomalous. The false alarm rate for this set of data was 0.0572%.
There are 17058 normal behavior sequences from Day 5. Following the same
procedure as above, after the Parallel Testing and Training phase we had 1055
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suspicious sequences there were sent to the Logic phase. After the Logic phase, we
had 71 sequences that satisfied condition we imposed for malicious sequences which
we sent on to the next phase for verification. There were only 2 sequences classified
as anomalous, which makes false alarm rate very low - 0.0117%. The results are
shown in Fig. 9.11.
Test data of Day 6 consists of 11145 sequences of length 100. After the phase of
Parallel Testing and Training we had 778 suspicious sequences that had to be passed
on the the next, Logic phase. Out of those, 96 sequences came out of the Logic phase
satisfying the conditions for malicious behavior and they were passed on to the next
stage for verification. There were 23 sequences classified as anomalous after the
execution of the whole algorithm, which makes the false alarm rate 0.2064%, which
is the maximum value of the false alarm rate over all days of normal behavior; results
are shown in Fig. 9.12.
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Test data in Day 7 consists of 8445 sequences of length 100. The sequences
are sent through the algorithm and the results are shown in Fig. 9.13. After phase
2, Parallel Testing and Training phase, we had 535 suspicious sequences. All of
those were sent through to Logic phase. Only the ones who satisfied our condition
for malicious behavior (58 in this case) were passed onto the next phase of the
algorithm for verification. At the end, we had total of 7 sequences that were classified
as anomalous. The false alarm rate for this set of data was 0.0829%.
There are 9143 normal behavior sequences from Day 8. Following the same
procedure as above, after the Parallel Testing and Training phase we had 632 suspi-
cious sequences there were sent to the Logic phase. After the Logic phase, we had 56
sequences that satisfied condition we imposed for malicious sequences which we sent
on to the next phase for verification. There were 6 sequences classified as anomalous,
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which makes false alarm rate 0.0656%. The results are shown in Fig. 9.14.
All of the above results show the tendency of radically improving (decreasing)
false alarm rate. This is very important since while it is relatively easy to improve
detection rate (for example by adding firewalls), it is not easy to get a good (low)
false positive rate. Comparative analysis of false alarm rate reduction through stages
for all 8 partitions of our normal behavior data is shown in Fig. 9.15 and it shows
the effect of our algorithm on false alarm rate.
Average false alarm rate, which is one of the main performance characteristics
of our algorithm, is shown in Fig. 9.16.
74
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
Parallel
testing and
training
Logic Verification
0.61%
0.065%
6.91%
Figure 9.14: False positive rate through stages - Day 8
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
Parallel
testing and
training
Logic Verification
Figure 9.15: False positive rate for all normal data through stages
75
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
Parallel
testing and
training
Logic Verification
6.0%
0.57%
0.087%
Figure 9.16: Average false positive rate through stages
76
Chapter 10
Conclusions
The goal of our proposed IDS solution was to find a way of implementing a
good trade-off between misuse and anomaly detection, resulting in perfect detection
and low false positive rate. The main component of it is detection and classification
of unknown network attacks.
Our scheme produces new models of previously unknown attacks as well as of
known attacks which have not been seen before in that form. The models are there
for administrator to look at them and confirm the nature of the possible attack
and classification. It relieves the administrator from looking through huge lists of
audit logs trying to find where something went wrong. Another advantage of the
scheme is that if any other information was used (like raw BSM data in this case),
no misclassification would be made (for known and unknown attack testing).
We can also observe that FFB attack seems to be more general than FORMAT
and EJECT, therefore there is a tendency to misclassify the other two as FFB.
Our main idea is to set detection high enough - in our case it is 100%, and
then filter out false positives through stages. The false positive rate we ended up
with seems to be very good - around 0.08%.
Another advantage of our scheme is that in our simulations all the attacks
belong to one group of attacks - buffer overflow attacks - which is a worst case
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scenario, attacks tend to ’look alike’. If we had other group of attacks to detect and
classify, we expect the results to be much better, since the models would differ more
among themselves.
We believe that finer tuning of probabilistic boundaries and better expert
(administrator) knowledge give room for significant improvement.
The drawback of this scheme is that we need extensive expert knowledge in
order to set up the databases correctly, and to include all possible dangerous events;
also, we need to be able to define the log-likelihood boundaries in the probabilistic
space as well as possible.
Our goal is to show that it is possible to detect and classify attack using
the mixture of probabilistic testing and logic, when we use only limited number of
parameters. In this case we used only system calls. In the real-world applications,
we might not know all the parameters attacker will use to compromise a system,
especially in the case of an unknown attack.
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